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Abstract 
The debate about the appropriate standards for upstream corporate social responsibility (CSR) of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) has been on the public and academic agenda for some three 
decades. The debate originally focused narrowly on “contract responsibility” of MNCs for 
monitoring of upstream contractors for “sweatshop” working conditions violating employee 
rights.  The authors argue that the MNC upstream responsibility debate has shifted qualitatively 
over time to “full producer responsibility” involving an expansion from “contract responsibility” 
in three distinct dimensions. First, there is an expansion of scope from working conditions to 
human rights and social and environmental impacts broadly defined. Second, there is expansion 
in depth of this broader responsibility to the whole upstream supply chain without regard to 
contracting status. Upstream responsibility now includes all suppliers, including direct 
contractors and the chain of suppliers to such contractors.  Finally, the change of CSR scope and 
depth has led to an evolution of CSR management practice.  
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Multinational corporations (MNCs) are embedded in highly complex and often globally 
organized value chains (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011). Value chain here is understood 
vertically – from material sourcing to production and final sale of the product to the customer. 
Downstream, businesses are connected with their customers and the social contexts, in which 
consumers and consumption acts are embedded.  Upstream, they are connected with their 
suppliers and the social contexts surrounding the various steps of production.  Following the 
terminology of Phillips and Caldwell (2005), there is a corresponding distinction between 
downstream and upstream corporate social responsibility (CSR).   
Downstream CSR examines a firm’s responsibility towards mainly consumers.  Classic 
downstream CSR examples are product safety and liability cases such as the flaws in the gas tank 
design of the Ford Pinto in the 1970s (Gioia, 1992). Other downstream CSR examples include 
smoking (Palazzo & Richter, 2005) and obesity (Schrempf, 2012). The key issue in downstream 
CSR is the impact of direct negative effects of product consumption (e.g. health consequences) 
on customers, but it increasingly includes indirect negative effects that consumption has on 
society in general (e.g. waste disposal or health and insurance costs provoked by obesity or 
smoking). 
In upstream CSR, the focus lies on the side effects that potentially occur in the production 
of goods and services. These side effects affect corporate suppliers and their employees as well 
as the local communities in which production activities are embedded. The authors focus on this 
side of the CSR debate. While recently consumption has also attracted an increasing scholarly 
interest (Smith, Palazzo, & Batthacharya, 2010), upstreaming CSR issues have been the focus of 
the public debate on the responsibility of corporations with regards to social and environmental 
challenges. This manifests in a rising tide of campaigns that non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs) launch against corporations since the late 1980s (Petersen, 1992; Sethi, 2003). NGO 
activism has been discussed as the key driver of CSR engagement of corporations connected to 
globally stretched production networks (Sethi, 2003; Zadek, 2004). As the upstream CSR debate 
is mainly driven by NGO activism, an analysis of how NGO activism has evolved over the last 
decades can provide relevant insights for CSR theory and practice.  
Hence, the authors review how the practical discourse on upstream CSR has evolved by 
analyzing the criticism and campaigns of NGOs over the last three decades. This review covers 
nine industries and shows which CSR demands were imposed on MNCs and how those demands 
developed. This historic review reveals an evolution of the upstream CSR debate from a narrow 
focus on violations of worker rights in contractors’ factories to a broader concern with violations 
of human rights and also social and environmental impacts along the complete corporate supply 
chain upstream of an MNC. A closer analysis of this historic evolution shows a qualitative 
difference between the traditional discussion and the current discussion on upstream CSR. The 
MNC upstream responsibility debate has shifted over time to “full producer responsibility” 
involving an expansion from “contract responsibility” in three distinct dimensions. First, there is 
an expansion of scope from working conditions to human rights and social and environmental 
impacts broadly defined. Second, there is an expansion in depth of this broader responsibility to 
the whole upstream supply chain without regard to contracting status. Upstream responsibility 
thus now includes all suppliers, including direct contractors and also the chain of suppliers to 
such contractors.  Finally, the change of CSR scope and depth has led to an evolvement of CSR 
management practice, which has evolved towards a proactive approach characterized by an 
increased political responsibility of corporations and increased cooperation among corporations 
and between corporations and other stakeholders. 
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The authors complement the practical analysis of the upstream CSR discourse with a 
review of the parallel evolution of the respective scientific discourse in three leading business 
ethics journals (Business & Society, Business Ethics Quarterly, and Journal of Business Ethics). 
Studying this historic evolution of upstream CSR in NGO demands and academic theorizing, the 
authors wish to contribute to the existing business ethics literature by reviewing NGO activism 
and academic scholarship, and by conceptualizing how the understanding of upstream CSR has 
evolved from a narrow focus on worker rights to full producer responsibility.     
Scholars (Freeman, 2004; Waddock, 2004) criticize the separation of theory and practice. 
Freeman (2004, p. 128) refers to the separation as “an incredible gap” and Waddock (2004, p. 5) 
as “parallel universes.” Both Freeman and Waddock call for bridging theory and practice. Rorty 
(1999) argues that focussing on one side provides an incomplete picture. The authors’ NGO and 
academic analyses address these concerns and provide a combined overview of how practice and 
theory on upstream CSR evolved. The main root of CSR practice is NGO activism, not new 
insights in theory. Therefore, it is relevant to look at the practical CSR debate (its beginning as 
well as development) to better understand how the scholarly debate has evolved over the last 
three decades. Reviewing the practical CSR debates helps scholars today to understand past 
theoretical work and might also hint to where the CSR literature is heading. Comparing the 
practical debate with the academic debate then allows for an analysis of the relationship between 
the two. The results reveal that the debates in practice and theory are not that separate. Actually, 
the authors observe a co-evolvement of the practical and theoretical debates.  
 The rest of the article is structured into three main sections. First, the authors present the 
findings of the review of major NGO activities. Second, the authors present the impact of the 
development of NGO activism on the CSR scope, CSR depth, and management practice. Third, 
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the authors elaborate on the findings of the review on academic scholarship on upstream CSR. 
Finally, directions for future research are provided before a conclusion is drawn 
 
Upstream CSR: The Evolution of NGO Campaigning Against MNCs 
The review of major NGO activities during the last few decades included academic articles on 
major NGO activities, NGO activities in the media, NGO publications (reports and campaigns), 
and NGO websites. This review covered nine industries (banana, chocolate, coffee, diamond, 
garment, information technology, oil, sportswear, and toy). Appendix A provides a selective 
overview of the upstream CSR debate in those industries, including the milestone campaigns that 
increased public awareness. The appendix does not list all the numerous NGO activities, 
campaigns, and initiatives. The appendix outlines the development of upstream CSR issues by 
highlighting the most prevalent NGO activities in different industries as perceived by the NGO 
community itself (Berne Declaration, 2010; Sluiter, 2009).   
Historically, the upstream CSR debate started as a critical analysis by activist NGOs of 
the production outsourcing of MNCs (Appelbaum & Dreier, 1999; Ballinger, 1992; Held, 
McGrath, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Since the 1970s, various industries have shifted 
production to selected developing and emerging countries (Green, 1998; Harney, 2009). In their 
bids to attract foreign investment, local governments were sometimes reluctant or too weak to 
regulate and enforce worker rights (Roach, 2005). The factory owners were struggling to keep 
the production costs low (Green, 1998). The result was that various goods were (and still are) 
produced in factories where employees, often women or even children, work overtime for long 
hours, sometimes for below local minimum wage and under low health-and-safety standards 
(Bigelow, 1997; Connor, 2002).  
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 Media coverage of questionable working conditions in developing countries and criticism 
of so-called “sweatshops” started as early as the 1980s (Petersen, 1992; Sethi, 2003). However, it 
was not until the 1990s that NGOs approached MNCs to take responsibility for the working 
conditions at their suppliers’ factories (McLaughlin, 1993; Morris, 1995). NGOs started to 
extend corporate boundaries of responsibility to include direct suppliers although those 
corporations were not legally liable for the behavior of their business partners (DeWinter, 2001). 
In general, the NGO approach was initially characterized by three elements: contract reasoning, 
stepwise campaigning, and logic of opposition.  
NGOs relied on contract-based reasoning to argue that MNCs’ responsibility extended 
towards their direct suppliers. Hence, NGOs focused on sweatshop conditions at MNCs’ direct 
suppliers. The contract reasoning helped establish direct links between MNCs and the working 
conditions in their direct suppliers’ factories (DeWinter, 2001). NGOs argued that MNCs could 
ensure decent working conditions the same way they ensured quality standards and delivery 
times through contracts with their suppliers. In this sense, sweatshop conditions would be a 
violation of the contract (Global Exchange, 2007). Student groups also used and still use the 
sponsoring contracts between sports brands and their universities to raise awareness (Appelbaum 
& Dreier, 1999; Phillips, 2010). The contract was perceived as the best means to solve the social 
problems in the supply chain. This contract-based reasoning signaled a liability understanding of 
responsibility that assumes a direct or causal relation between the harm and the actor (Honoré, 
1999; Young, 2006). Given the NGOs’ focus on contracts between MNCs and their suppliers, 
the authors refer to this initial upstream CSR debate as contract upstream CSR or “contract 
responsibility.” 
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Second, NGOs followed a stepwise approach when targeting corporations. They first 
focused on strong industry leaders before moving on to other companies or the industry in 
general. Global Exchange or United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), in their respective 
campaigns, focused first on the industry leader Gap in the garment industry, Nike in the 
sportswear industry, and Starbucks in the coffee industry (Global Exchange, 2008). Once the 
targeted companies started improving, NGOs pressured other companies in the same industry to 
follow suit. If the companies failed to make credible efforts in fixing their supply chain 
problems, NGOs kept their pressure on the targeted adversaries (Connor, 2002). In their stepwise 
approach, leading brands were used as a leverage to impose new standards on industry.  
The authors’ review of NGO campaigns in nine industries revealed that after the garment 
and sportswear industries, NGOs gradually targeted other industries (Global Exchange, 2008; 
Sluiter, 2009). Table 1 summarizes how the focus of attention shifted, with time, from one sector 
to the other.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Even though the first reports about bad working conditions on agricultural farms were 
published earlier (see Riisgaard, 2004), awareness of worker rights violations in the banana 
industry gained momentum only after the Joint Global Chiquita campaign in 1998 (Riisgaard, 
2004). After targeting the garment industry, the National Labor Committee (NLC) (2001) 
investigated worker rights violations in Chinese toy factories. When the NLC launched its toy 
campaign, the public awareness of bad conditions in this industry increased considerably 
(National Labor Committee, 2001; Vêtements Propres, 2002). Other NGOs such as the Clean 
Clothes Campaign followed and included the toy industry in their campaigns (Sluiter, 2009). 
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Agricultural products also have gained increased attention of NGOs. As the labor-intensive part 
of the supply chain happened to be on plantations and farms, NGOs progressively worked their 
way up to the sourcing stage. Worker rights violations found on coffee and cocoa farms were 
similar to those found in suppliers’ factories (Global Exchange, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 
2002). However, according to the Swiss NGO Berne Declaration (2010), no debate about bad 
working conditions in the chocolate industry came up until 2001. An important milestone in this 
industry was the launching of Global Exchange’s (2003) chocolate fair trade campaign. Finally, 
the Information Technology (IT) industry was amongst the last industries being targeted by 
NGOs for sweatshop conditions. The first coordinated NGO campaign against Dell, Hewlett-
Packard, and IBM by the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development in 2004 was a milestone 
in the contract upstream CSR debate in that industry (Astill & Griffith, 2004). 
Finally, the way NGOs and activists approached corporations through the 1990s can be 
best described as ‘naming and shaming’ following a logic of opposition (National Labor 
Committee, 2001). NGOs published reports and triggered media broadcasts, often with dramatic 
photos, pushing the target corporations directly into the spotlight (Noros & Emery, 1999). In 
general, they approached corporations in a rather aggressive and demanding way with boycotts, 
anti-corporate campaigns (Beder, 2002; Sage, 1999), and anti-company photographs (Sluiter, 
2009). For instance, activists attacked Starbucks shops in Seattle in 1999 (Alden, 2000) and 
Global Exchange threatened Starbucks with a campaign during the company’s shareholder 
meeting (Garcia-Johnson, 2003; R. T. Nelson, 2000). During the 1990s, NGOs and activists 
considered corporations to be “bad” (Le Menestrel, van den Hove, & de Bettignies, 2002; Nesbit, 
1998) and identified them as being part of the problem (Astill & Griffith, 2004; Bjurling, 2004). 
C&A was derisively called “Cheap&Awful” by the Dutch NGO community (Sluiter, 2009).  
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 While the focus of contract upstream CSR has been the potentially exploitative relation 
between MNCs and their contractors, NGOs have moved beyond contract-reasoning. Today, 
some NGOs demand a “full supply chain approach up to the extractive phase” (Steinweg & de 
Haan, 2007, p. 5). Upstream CSR now includes the complete production process from resource 
extraction to product assembly. Following the terminology of NGOs (Steinweg & de Haan, 
2007), the current upstream CSR debate is referred to as full producer upstream CSR. 
The authors’ NGO review revealed two key differences in regard to the NGO approach in 
contract upstream CSR and full producer upstream CSR: social connection reasoning and the 
logic of cooperation. Departing from contract reasoning (Global Exchange, 2007), NGOs today 
increasingly use a social connection logic to link MNCs to societal and environmental side 
effects along their supply chains such as the relocation of indigenous communities (Robin Wood, 
2006). According to a social connection logic, responsibility is derived “from belonging together 
with others in a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition” (Young, 
2006, p. 119). For instance, the Burma Campaign connects any corporation operating in Burma 
to the occurring human rights violations in that country (Richardson, 2009).  
Second, the “naming and shaming” approach towards corporations and logic of 
opposition as applied in contract upstream CSR appear less in current NGO campaigns. NGOs 
still use anti-corporate campaigns such as Greenpeace’s Kit Kat Campaign (Greenpeace 
International, 2010), but the cooperation between NGOs and MNCs has become an additional 
option for action. The authors observe increasingly common self-regulatory activities such as 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) in which numerous corporations and NGOs together define 
standards and develop mechanisms of implementation and control. Therefore, campaigns are 
often a means to pressure corporations into collaboration: Nestlé joined the Roundtable on 
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Sustainable Palm Oil after the Greenpeace campaign. NGOs seem to increasingly consider 
MNCs as part of the solution: NGOs and MNCs engage more and more in dialogues, stakeholder 
meetings, and roundtables (for an overview of MSIs, see Mena & Palazzo, 2012). 
This shift from contract responsibility to full producer responsibility also affects the scope 
of CSR issues, the depth of CSR issues, and related management practice  
 
Beyond the Contract: The Extended Scope and Depth of Responsibility Claims 
Based on their review of NGO practice, the authors argue that there are three qualitative 
differences between upstream contract CSR and upstream full producer CSR regarding the scope 
of CSR, the depth of CSR, and CSR management practices.  
CSR Scope: The review of NGO practice revealed that the upstream CSR scope has 
shifted from a focus on worker rights to human rights in general. Ethical issues, such as 
environmental responsibility (Guerrette, 1986) and bribery (Lane & Simpson, 1984), were 
discussed in the 1990s and before. However, the contract upstream CSR debate with a focus on 
worker rights violations at corporate contractors dominated the CSR debate (see Armbruster-
Sandoval, 1999; Laabs, 1995, Sethi, 2003). Awareness of sweatshop conditions (i.e. bad working 
conditions such as compensation below minimum wages, and child labor) in the garment 
industry rose among students at Duke University in the mid-1990s (Appelbaum & Dreier, 1999; 
Greenhouse, 1996). The students’ anti-sweatshop movement began expanding to many other 
American universities (Greenhouse, 1999), which eventually led to the creation of USAS, the 
Worker Rights Consortium, and the Fair Labor Association (USAS, 2008). The main worker 
rights violations included child labor, low health-and-safety standards, and the suppression of 
worker unions (Connor, 2002; Green, 1998).  
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When we look at the current upstream CSR debate about full producer responsibility, the 
authors observe that CSR issues have considerably broadened. Following an earlier and similar 
debate within the diamond industry (Global Witness, 1998), today cell phone (Global Witness, 
2009), computer (Steinweg & de Haan, 2007), and car manufacturers (Steinweg, 2010) are 
alleged to be financing civil war and armed conflicts through their material sourcing in conflict 
zones (Steinweg, 2010). NGOs claim that MNCs are complicit in such human rights violations. 
Most probably, the first case to gain publicity in terms of corporate complicity in human rights 
violations was the Shell-Ogoni crisis in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The Ogoni 
people in Nigeria were fighting for greater control over the natural resources on their lands, 
which led to violent conflicts between their community and national armed security forces 
(Amnesty International, 2005). As Shell was operating in the Nigerian region at that time, it soon 
found itself confronted with demands to investigate its involvement in and contributions to the 
human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2005).  
The critique of Shell’s complicity in the armed conflict between indigenous groups and 
military groups appeared around the same time as the contract upstream CSR debate. The 
authors argue that those two debates cannot be summarized under the same CSR umbrella, 
because their demands and logic are different. In contract upstream CSR, the focus was on 
worker rights violations to which MNCs were directly linked through their outsourcing contracts 
with suppliers where such violations occurred (Kernaghan, 1998) and followed a principal-agent 
logic. In those sweatshop cases, the term complicity was not used. By contrast, the Shell case 
focused on human rights violations in which Shell was indirectly involved as an accomplice 
(Clapham & Jerbi, 2001). In that case, the human rights abuse was undertaken by state agencies, 
not economic business partners.  
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This terminology of complicity is an important qualitative difference between contract 
and full producer upstream CSR. In contrast to contract upstream CSR, MNCs are accused of 
complicity in human rights violations perpetrated by state actors with whom MNCs are linked 
(Tofalo, 2006). The lawsuit in the Shell-Ogoni case that began in 1996 and ended with a 
settlement in 2009 served as a catalyst in setting off similar demands in other industries. By the 
end of the 1990s, Global Witness (1998) verified the involvement of diamond companies in 
financing civil war in Angola. Today, computer, cell phone, and car manufacturers are 
confronted with similar claims (Steinweg, 2010; Steinweg & de Haan, 2007). Agricultural 
products, such as cocoa and bananas, are also often sourced in countries with unstable or 
oppressive regimes. In 2007, Global Witness (2007) issued a report scrutinizing how chocolate 
companies financed armed conflicts along the Ivory Coast. Recently, the timber corporation 
Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman was accused for having financed the war in Liberia through its 
operations in that country (Global Witness, Sherpa, Greenpeace, & Les Amis de la Terre, 2009).  
The growing importance of overall human rights violations can be seen in the increased 
lawsuits against corporations under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) (Jackson, 2009). The 
ATCA enables citizens of any nationality to sue an entity for a tort committed outside of the 
United States (Jackson, 2009). As observed by Jackson (2009), ATCA cases increasingly deal 
with corporate involvement in human rights violations. Even though, a considerable amount of 
those lawsuits were dismissed, the fact that corporations are increasingly sued under ATCA 
evidences the trend of broadening upstream CSR demands to include human rights violations. 
CSR Depth: The shift from contract reasoning to social connection has an effect on the 
depth of CSR issues. While NGOs focused on CSR issues at MNCs’ direct contractors at the 
beginning of the upstream CSR debate, NGO demands, today, go far beyond issues at 
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contractors’ facilities. In reviewing the 1990s sweatshop debate, it appears that NGOs focused 
mainly on CSR issues at direct supplier factories of MNCs where their products were assembled 
(Kernaghan, 1998; Sethi, 2003). In some cases, factory workers could provide NGOs with the 
brand name stitched on a shirt, shoe, toy, or laptop (Astill & Griffith, 2004; Kernaghan, 1996; 
National Labor Committee, 2001). For Global Exchange (2007) MNCs are responsible for CSR 
issues at their direct suppliers’ factories because they are the more powerful entity in the contract 
relationship and can dictate the terms of the contract. 
Today, NGOs address CSR issues deeper in the supply chain: ten years after NLC urged 
Kathie Lee Gifford to stop child labor in her clothing line factories (Kernaghan, 1996), the 
Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) exposed the bad working conditions on cotton farms in 
Uzbekistan. The EJF demanded that H&M and other clothing retailers “engage with civil society 
groups and international organizations in joint efforts to improve working conditions on cotton 
farms and remuneration provided to farmers and other workers” (EJF, 2005, p. 42). Even though 
the poor working conditions on farms have been under criticism in contract upstream CSR (i.e. 
coffee, banana, and cocoa farms), the EJF’s critique was novel in the sense that it mandated the 
targeted industries to go deeper into their supply chains and manage worker rights violations up 
to the first step of their production process (EJF, 2005). In contrast to the initial contract 
upstream CSR debate, MNCs do not have any direct contractual agreement with those actors 
further up their value chain, where the harm actually occurs.  
 The trend of expanding CSR demands along the complete supply chain can also be 
observed in other industries, such as in the IT industry. NGOs refer to extractive industries as 
“the forgotten link in the supply chain management of electronic consumer products” (Steinweg 
& de Haan, 2007, p. 5). SwedWatch raised awareness of the low health-and-safety standards and 
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low wages for workers and contractors of the extractive industry in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Zambia, and demanded that electronics companies take action (Nordbrand & Bolme, 
2007). The NGO urged consumer electronics companies, including cell phone producers, to 
include the extractive industry in their supply chain management and monitoring system to 
mitigate the sweatshop conditions prevailing at the sourcing level. Recently, NGOs stretched the 
chain of social connectedness even further. Instead of approaching cell phone producers 
regarding CSR issues in the extractive industry, they prevailed on cell network operators, like T-
Mobile in Germany, to improve their supply chain management (van Huijstee, de Haan, 
Poyhonen, Heydenreich, & Riddselius, 2009). In none of the cases above does a contract exist 
between the MNC and the mining companies.  
The CSR depth expanded in other sectors as well. Even though the CSR debate in the 
agricultural sector pertains to CSR issues at the sourcing level, there is an apparent expansion of 
CSR demands in this sector, too. For example, Oxfam Germany went beyond the MNCs such as 
Chiquita that had already been criticized for poor working conditions on their plantations 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002). It published the results of its analysis of human rights violations in 
the production of pineapples and bananas, and argued that Germany’s biggest retailers and 
discounters have a responsibility (Wiggerthale, 2008). These retailers and discounters, however, 
do often not have contracts with fruit plantations. A similar expansion can be found in the coffee 
industry. While US/LEAP and Global Exchange focused mainly on coffee roasters like 
Starbucks, Nestlé, and Procter & Gamble during the 1990s, Oxfam America urged supermarkets 
and coffee bars to demand that their suppliers pay fair wages to coffee farmers and participate in 
fair trade programs (Gresser & Tickell, 2002).  
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Hence, one of the key impacts of the shift in NGO practice from contract to full producer 
responsibility is an expanded CSR depth: CSR demands expand along the supply chain –
addressing issues further up in the supply chain (cotton, conflict minerals) and actors further 
down the supply chain (cell phone operators, supermarkets).  
Management Practice: The shift from NGOs’ logic of opposition to logic of cooperation 
as well as their shift from contract reasoning to social connection reasoning had an impact on 
CSR management practice. In particular, CSR management has moved from being reactive to 
proactive, from a compliance-oriented responsibility to political responsibility, and from a 
company focus to cooperation. 
In the 1990s, corporate reaction to NGO criticism was mainly defensive, compliance-
oriented, and reactive (Zadek, 2004). Corporations were reluctant to release information on their 
supply chain relations and their CSR approach. Nike, one of the main targets of NGO attacks 
during the 1990s, kept silent for a long time (Zadek, 2004). MNCs used the independence of 
their suppliers as a legal firewall, claiming that they could not be held responsible for the 
behavior of their legally independent suppliers (Kahle, Boush, & Phelps, 2000). This attitude 
signaled an understanding of responsibility building on strict liability (Ruggie, 2007), according 
to which actors are responsible only for the harm they directly cause through their own action 
(Honoré, 1999).  
After persistent anti-sweatshop campaigning, corporations realized that the anti-
sweatshop movement exposed them to financial risks (Sethi, 2003). Some of them started 
responding with compliance and monitoring (Sluiter, 2009). The key compliance tool, introduced 
by various MNCs during the 1990s, was a code of conduct that was used to control suppliers’ 
social and ethical performance (Graafland, 2002; Winstanley, Clark, & Leeson, 2002). Various 
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MNCs, such as Reebok, Wal-Mart, Disney, and Nike established codes of conduct (see Harney, 
2009) and included code compliance as a requirement in their supplier contracts. In 1998, Nike 
announced the introduction of new policies regarding working conditions at the sites of its 
suppliers (Connor, 2001). These included, for instance, increasing the minimum age of workers 
to 18 in footwear factories, and to 16 in apparel factories (Connor, 2001). The 1990s saw a 
mushrooming of individual company codes, but only very few industry-wide initiatives 
(Hussain-Khaliq, 2004; Zadek, 2004). 
When NGOs continued their pressure on MNCs and even expanded the CSR scope and 
depth as previously discussed, some corporations have slowly started to acknowledge full 
producer upstream CSR, as is indicated by several developments. First, some corporations 
started to approach CSR issues proactively. For instance, even before the first NGO campaigns 
emerged in the IT sector, Hewlett-Packard (HP) established its supplier code of conduct in 2002 
(HP, 2003). Further, in 2008, HP published a list of most of its direct suppliers without having 
been pressured to do so (Hewlett-Packard, 2008). Second, some corporations have started to 
become more transparent as the publication of HP’s suppliers list indicates. A few companies are 
relatively more transparent regarding their supply chain management (van Huijstee et al., 2009), 
a transparency which would have been rather unthinkable in the mid-1990s when sweatshop 
demands first emerged (see Zadek, 2004). Third, MNCs tend to engage in more cooperation both 
within and across industries and with civil society groups. In 2004, several IT companies 
established the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC – today Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition) which defines worker rights standards at suppliers in the industry (EICC, 
2005). Other examples of joint corporate initiatives are the Business Leaders Initiative on Human 
Rights and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative. Additionally, some corporations have started to 
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cooperate with NGOs. General Motors’ subsidiary in Colombia, for example, cooperated with a 
local NGO to train “former members of paramilitary groups as a way to reintegrate them into 
society” (Oetzel et al., 2010, p. 356). Yet another example of an MNC-NGO partnership is HP’s 
cooperation with Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (Chan, 2009). Since 
2007, they have been training employees at one of HP’s Chinese suppliers about labor rights 
(Chan, 2009). Only recently, Coca Cola agreed to support the Colalife initiative to transport 
important social and medical products through its corporate distribution network in developing 
countries (Berry, 2009). These examples indicate that corporations increasingly react to an 
NGO’s logic of cooperation by starting discourses and engaging in dialogues with civil society 
actors and by participating in MSIs. Those MSIs increasingly move from compliance to 
empowerment logic: The Fair Labor Association fosters capacity building at the supplier level to 
implement mechanisms for sustainable labor rights compliance (FLA, 2008). Similar trends 
towards an empowerment approach can be seen in the Fair Wear Foundation or the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative.  
In sum, reviewing NGO practice during the last 30 years indicates related changes in 
CSR scope, CSR depth, and management practice. However, as Walsh (2005) concluded in his 
analysis, this broader and deeper engagement of corporations is difficult to understand and 
categorize against the background of existing concepts of CSR. This observation makes the need 
for a review of the academic perception of the practical CSR discourse between NGOs and 
MNCs prevalent. The authors argue that the understanding of corporate responsibility in the 
context of globally stretched production networks which manifest in the above analyzed history 
of civil society engagement is also reflected in the recent debate on the politicization of the firm 
(Kobrin, 2009; Matten & Crane, 2005; Ruggie, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007 and 2011)  
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Upstream CSR: The Evolution of the Academic Perception 
The authors paralleled analysis of the NGO campaigning against MNCs with an analysis of the 
scholarly discourse on upstream CSR in three influential journals that specialize in social issues 
in management: Business & Society, Business Ethics Quarterly, and Journal of Business Ethics. 
Since the upstream CSR debate commenced in the 1980s, the review was limited to articles 
published between 1980 and 2010.  
Based on the NGO activities review, the authors, independently of each other, prepared a 
list of keywords that would be used to search the three journals systematically. The authors then 
consolidated their lists and discussed any discrepancies, deciding on the following keywords:  
child labor, citizenship, code of ethics, complicity, corporate citizenship, human rights, labor 
laws, outsourcing, political activity, supply chain, sweatshop, and wage.   
The authors used the search engines on the database Business Source Complete and on 
the websites of the journals to search for each of those keywords mentioned above under subject 
terms, and saved the articles that contained any of the keywords in an Excel sheet. Some of the 
articles, which contained two or more of the selected keywords, appeared repetitively under the 
respective keywords. Any duplicates were deleted. This procedure left more than 700 articles for 
review. The search for “code of ethics” alone revealed almost 500 articles, most focused on 
employee codes of ethics and organizational behavior. The literature review focused on 
upstream-related CSR issues only. Hence, each of the authors reviewed the articles carefully 
(and independently of each other) to determine whether they fit the criteria (upstream CSR and 
keywords). The authors discussed their screening results and jointly agreed on the exclusion of 
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articles that did not meet the criteria. As a result 150 articles (20 in Business and Society, 39 in 
Business Ethics Quarterly, and 91 in Journal of Business Ethics) were selected.   
The 150 articles were categorized into the two phases of upstream CSR that the authors 
developed from the NGO discourse: contract upstream CSR and full producer upstream CSR. 
The articles were carefully read, and then assigned independently to one of the two upstream 
CSR streams by each author. Studies that dealt primarily with worker rights violations at direct 
suppliers were categorized as contract upstream CSR. Articles that dealt with the broader human 
rights issues along the complete corporate supply chains were categorized under full producer 
upstream CSR. The authors compared their findings with each other, and agreed on a final list of 
classification. 74 and 69 articles were categorized under contract CSR and full producer CSR, 
respectively. 7 articles were assigned to both categories as they discussed worker and human 
rights in such a way that it was impossible for the authors to decide on any single categorization 
assignment. Table 2 provides an overview of the number of articles per upstream CSR phase at 
5-year intervals per journal reviewed. The 7 articles that fell under both categories were counted 
as one in each category. As a result of this limited double counting, the total number of articles in 
Table 2 sums up to 157 rather than 150. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Publications on full producer upstream CSR issues appeared only sporadically between the 
1980s and 1990s (Christensen, 1997; Getz, 1997). However, since the new millennium, a 
considerable increase in articles discussing full producer upstream CSR issues can be observed 
compared to the increase in articles about contract upstream CSR. The majority of articles on full 
producer upstream CSR were published between 2006 and 2010: 9 of the 14 articles in Business 
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and Society (64%), and 28 of the 40 articles in Journal of Business Ethics (70%). Considering 
the total amount of articles on full producer upstream CSR, 47 of the 76 articles were published 
between 2006 and 2010 (61%). The increased interest in the broader upstream CSR debate can 
also be seen by the growth of articles with human rights as a subject term. Between 1980 and 
2000, there were 13 articles on upstream CSR issues published with human rights as a subject 
term. Between 2001 and 2010, that number more than doubled, with 28 articles on upstream 
CSR issues being published with that subject term.  
The growing academic interest in business and human rights mirrors the practical debate 
on upstream CSR as manifesting in NGO activities and campaigns. One conclusion of this 
literature review is that the practical and academic debates on upstream CSR have co-evolved, 
both moving from a narrow debate on worker rights to a broader debate on human rights. The 
authors’ intention here is not to examine a causal relationship between the practical and the 
scholarly debate on upstream CSR. The authors do abstain from speculating about the causal 
relation between both debates, making no claims on whether or not NGO campaigning and the 
related media coverage triggered the scientific debate or whether there is a reverse causality. For 
the sake of the presented argument, it is sufficient to demonstrate that both debates move in a 
similar direction, broadening the scope of corporate responsibility and reconceptualizing it in 
such a way that two different logics – the contract responsibility and the full producer 
responsibility - emerge. Both the NGO campaigns and the scholarly debate target the same 
challenges which result from the accelerating globalization of production activities which can be 
observed during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s.  
 
Academic Perception: Contract Upstream CSR 
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In the spirit of contract upstream CSR, scholars specifically refer to legal and ethical theories to 
fortify NGO demands for corporate responsibility of sweatshops. Building on the legal approach 
of respondeat superior, Santoro (2000) argues that the parent corporation is responsible for legal, 
as well as labor rights violations of its direct supply contractors if the violations occur during the 
currency of their contract. Using Kantian ethics, Arnold and Bowie (2003) derive specific 
corporate duties like providing living wages and safety standards for employees in suppliers’ 
factories. This mirrors the NGO demands of the traditional upstream CSR phase in which NGOs 
focused on labor rights issues at corporate contractors (Green, 1998; Kernaghan, 1998). Other 
researchers argued that, in a corporation-supplier relationship, the more powerful entity bears the 
greater stake of responsibility (Reed, 1999). Taking a different approach, Donaldson and Dunfee 
(1994) followed social contract theory to argue in favor of corporate responsibility for direct 
suppliers. Their Integrative Social Contract Theory accounts for contextual differences and at the 
same time guarantees the respect of hypernorms (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). Logsdon and 
Wood (2002), arguing along the lines of Donaldson and Dunfee (1994), apply the universal 
concept of business citizenship which views corporations as global responsibility actors with the 
duty of adhering to universal human rights.  
As the corporations reacted to contract upstream CSR demands with codes of conduct as 
discussed earlier, scholars examined these codes of conduct extensively (see the meta-study of 
Collins, 2000; Weaver, 1993). Even though codes of conduct are criticized for lacking clarity 
and ambiguity (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999) there appears to be an implicit assumption that 
they apply to direct suppliers only: Research on their effectiveness focuses on empirical studies 
with direct corporate contractors (Egels-Zandén, 2007). In their research, Kolk and van Tulder 
(2002) discuss the complexity and difficulty for MNCs to extend their codes beyond direct 
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suppliers and conclude that this might not be realistic. However, as discussed in the first part of 
the article, NGOs have successfully extended the notion of CSR, which was acknowledged in 
business ethics research, especially from the new millennium onwards.  
 
Academic Perception: Full Producer Upstream CSR 
The enlarged demands towards MNCs regarding their complicity in human rights violations 
(EJF, 2007; Global Witness, 2009; Steinweg, 2010) manifests in research. Scholars advanced 
their theories gradually to examine this trend in upstream CSR, and examined new concepts, 
such as the sphere of influence (Matten & Crane, 2005; Young, 2006).  
The apartheid discussion was a forerunner to the debate on corporate involvement in 
human rights violations within the corporate sphere of influence (see Fieldhouse, 2005; Rohter, 
1985). NGOs argued that MNCs indirectly supported and approved apartheid through their 
business presence in South Africa and demanded corporate divestment (Schutt, 1998). While this 
debate was an isolated and special case, the globalization of production activities placed the 
human rights problems on center stage and politicized the debate on CSR in academia. Since the 
new millennium, we can observe that the human rights debate covered numerous subjects of 
academic interest: corporate activities in conflict zones (Idahosa, 2002; Wettstein, 2010), 
corporations’ roles in peace (Fort & Schipani, 2004; J. Nelson, 2000), in global governance 
(Kobrin, 2008; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006), in censorship (Brenkert, 2009; Schrempf, 
2011), corruption (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008), and public health (Maguire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004).  
The concept of sphere of influence became important in fortifying NGOs’ demands along 
corporate supply chains. Scholars have started to refine and clarify the concept by highlighting 
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its two key components: do no harm (Santoro, 2009) and enable problem solutions (Young, 
2006). “Do no harm” forms the primary duty which Santoro (2009) defines as to not violate any 
fundamental human rights – neither directly nor as an accomplice. The doctrine of do no harm is 
strongly linked to the concept of complicity which gained publicity in CSR practice and research 
(Clapham, 2006). Hsieh (2009, p. 251) argues that MNCs “have a responsibility to promote well-
ordered social and political institutions in host countries that lack them.”   
“Enable problem solutions” adverts to the facilitation of social and economic rights as 
envisaged, for instance, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of the United Nations. The core of enabling problem solutions is to consider political 
infrastructure and structural injustices (Young, 2006). Enabling problem solutions means 
scrutinizing existing injustices and societal problems. Corporations can play a crucial role in 
facilitating positive changes. Matten and Crane (2005) refer to such activities as corporate 
citizenship. Academics increasingly consider corporations’ involvement and potential in 
fostering positive changes in various areas such as education, social security, human rights, 
protection, and social ills (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). 
Hence, the academic perception of the broader upstream CSR demands by NGOs 
translates into a politicization of CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The key argument of this 
debate is that globalization brought about a change in the balance of power between business and 
politics. While corporations have expanded their operations globally, the regulatory power of 
governments has remained limited to national boundaries (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer, 
Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006). Furthermore, for several decades, production activities, including 
the exploitation of resources, have been shifting to weak or non-democratic regulatory contexts. 
MNCs operate in zones of conflict, collaborate with repressive regimes, and produce in countries 
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where governments are unable or unwilling to enforce human rights (Brenkert, 2009; Matten & 
Crane, 2005). As a result, corporations often operate in a regulatory vacuum and get entangled in 
various social and environmental problems. A key observation of scholars advocating a 
politicized view of CSR is that private actors, such as corporations or NGOs, practice self-
regulation by developing behavioral standards and complying with them voluntarily (Detomasi, 
2007). In political sciences, sociology, and political philosophy, the debate over private 
regulation started in the 1990s, when the fall of the Berlin Wall triggered a discussion of the 
consequences of that event for the political organization of the 20th century nation state order. 
Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), for instance, expected a rise of private regulation, which they 
labeled governance with and without government. Held et al. (1999) described the global 
transformation of political, cultural, and economic processes, Habermas (2001) examined the 
normative consequences of this “postnational constellation” of regulation, and Ulrich Beck 
(2000) described the growing influence of civil society on political decision making as “politics 
from below”. Initially, as Scherer and Palazzo (2007) argued, this analysis of deep societal 
transformation was largely ignored among scholars in the business and society domains, where 
governance continued to be understood as the ability of national governments to create stable 
regulatory frameworks around corporations. The shift towards the politicization of CSR (Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007) mirrors the changes with regards to the evolution of NGO campaigning against 
MNCs.  
 
Conclusions  
Since the 1980s, upstream CSR issues have been receiving increasing attention in the public 
debate and academia. Because there are several conceptual differences between CSR demands of 
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the 1980s/1990s and those of today, the authors argue that it is reasonable to distinguish between 
two phases, labeled as contract upstream CSR and full producer upstream CSR. Reviewing NGO 
activism and campaigning over the last 30 years revealed that NGOs changed their approach 
from a focus on contracts between MNCs and their direct suppliers to a focus on a more lose 
connection between MNCs and all entities along the complete supply chain. Also, NGOs have 
changed their initial opposition towards MNCs to a more cooperative spirit. This development in 
NGO pressure has led to a qualitative change of the upstream CSR debate in CSR scope, CSR 
depth, and CSR management practice.  
The authors’ main thesis that there has been a shift in upstream CSR discourse derives 
from their review of NGO campaigns between 1980 and 2010. Comparing the first NGO 
campaigns and activities with the latest NGO campaigns and activities in each of the nine 
industries illustrated a major difference in CSR scope and depth. For instance, while the first 
campaigns by the Clean Clothes Campaign, the NLC, and SOMO against garment corporations 
focused on labor rights issues at the end of the 1980s, the latest campaigns by the EJF targeting 
corporations from the very same industry focus on CSR issues that are deeper in the supply chain 
(clean cotton) and broader (human rights). Having identified such differences between early and 
more recent NGO campaigns in each industry serves as a strong indication and evidence for the 
authors’ main conclusion that upstream CSR issues have qualitatively evolved.  
Summarizing the authors’ analysis, the authors find that the traditional contract upstream 
CSR debate follows a legalistic logic and focuses on worker rights and the direct relations 
between MNCs and their suppliers. Those corporations targeted by NGOs often reacted by 
including codes of conduct in their contracts with suppliers and enforced them through 
individual auditing systems. The more recent development in the upstream CSR debate, full 
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producer CSR, operates with a broader agenda. From human rights to complicity with repressive 
regimes to environmental challenges, it includes all operations upstreaming the value chain as 
well as their respective geopolitical contexts. Such a concept of upstream CSR follows a political 
logic that manifests in more collaborative and deliberative solutions: individual corporate 
initiatives are less important than MSIs that provide solutions on a broader scale – across 
industries and beyond. Instead of individual codes of conduct, such initiatives produce soft law 
regulation (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  
The evolution of upstream CSR into a broader political conception raises numerous 
questions which future research should address. While reviewing the NGO activities some 
questions about the legitimacy of NGO activities and demands kept re-emerging. Therefore, the 
authors end the article with a brief review of two critical challenges for future research.  
CSR Issue Emergence: The review of the NGO activities over the last few decades 
reveals that NGOs gradually shifted their focus from worker rights violations to the broader 
sphere of human rights violations. As Zadek (2004, p.127) mentions “the trick, then, is for 
companies to be able to predict and credibly respond to society’s changing awareness of 
particular issues.” The challenge is to determine why certain issues make their way into the 
public civil society agenda at a particular time. Problems such as child labor in outsourcing 
production activities have already been there for a long time; however, they only gained public 
momentum during the last 20 years. Future research needs to investigate why certain issues 
remain dormant and why other issues emerge, evolve, and gain public awareness (Bonardi & 
Keim, 2005; Zadek, 2004). For example, Dahan and Gittens (2010) use the debate about CSR 
issues in the cocoa industry, to illustrate such a process of issue emergence. Future research 
might find a more comprehensive explanation for the emergence of full producer upstream CSR. 
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Legitimacy Challenges: NGOs and corporations are increasingly involved in global 
governance. By their self-regulatory engagement, they assume a political role for which they 
have no democratic mandate. Originally, governments had the monopoly over the process of 
administering, enabling, and securing human, civil, political, and social rights. But, owing to 
oppressive regimes or failed states, it may not always be possible to secure such rights; therefore, 
corporations are increasingly required to get politically involved to secure such rights (Matten & 
Crane, 2005). But, how can the political engagement of corporations and NGOs be legitimized 
(Baur & Palazzo, 2011)? 
In conclusion, this article illustrates how the debate about worker rights violations in 
corporate supply chains evolved since the 1980s. The problems with sweatshop working 
conditions of direct suppliers remains a highly complex challenge for MNCs such as Nike and 
Apple, who are far from tackling the problem efficiently (Duhigg & Barboza, 2012). However, 
as the authors demonstrated, the debate on upstream CSR has become much broader. What 
began as a debate on sweatshops has morphed, over time, into a broader debate that does not 
replace the critical analysis of sweatshop working conditions, but instead creates a higher order 
debate on the moral and political responsibility of businesses in a globalizing world. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Contract Upstream CSR: Industry Highlights 
Year Industry Occasion 
1993 Garment The Gap Campaign (The National Labor Committee) 
1996 Sportswear Nike Campaign (Global Exchange) 
1998 Banana Joint global NGO campaign against Chiquita 
1999 Toys Toy Campaign (The National Labor Committee) 
2000 Coffee Starbucks campaign (Global Exchange) 
2002 Chocolate  Fair Trade Chocolate Campaign (Global Witness) 
2004 ICT Launch of "Clean up your computer" campaign (CAFOD) 
 
 
Table 2. Categorization of Academic Publications in Upstream CSR into Contract Responsibility 
(CUCSR) and Full Producer Responsibility (FPUCSR)  
 
 Business and 
Society 
Business Ethics 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Business Ethics Total 
Period CUCSR FPUCSR CUCSR FPUCSR CUCSR FPUCSR CUCSR FPUCSR 
1980- 
1985 
0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 
1986- 
1990 
1 0 0 0 3 1 4 1 
1991- 
1995 
1 0 1 4 0 2 2 6 
1996- 
2000 
1 1 4 6 4 2 9 9 
2001- 
2005 
1 4 4 2 14 7 19 13 
2006- 
2010 
3 9 8 10 32 28 43 47 
Total 7 14 17 22 57 40 81 76 
Note: A complete list of the 150 articles included in the analysis of the scholarly discourse on 
upstream CSR is available on request.  Please contact corresponding author.  The table count 
sums to 157, because 7 articles are double counted as explained in the text. 
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APPENDIX A 
Examples of Main NGO Campaigns by Industry 
 
Sportswear Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1994 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  Agir Ici Sports industry 
1995 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  CCC Nike 
1995 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  Christian Aid Sports industry 
1996 Foulball Campaign: child labor in football stitching 
International Labor 
Rights Forum Sports industry 
1996 Take responsibility for bad working conditions in contractor factories Global Exchange Nike 
1997 Official formation of United Students Against Sweatshops USAS 
Sports industry 
(universities) 
1997 Child labor and bad working conditions  Christian Aid Sports industry 
1997 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  Vietnam Labor Watch Nike 
1997 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  
Asia Monitor 
Resource Centre, 
Hong Kong Christian 
Industrial Committee  
Nike, Reebok 
1999 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  Südwind 
adidas Group, 
Nike 
2000 Child labor and bad working conditions in football stitching 
India Committee of 
Netherlands Sports industry 
2000 Euro 2000: Improve labor conditions CCC Sports industry 
2001 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  CCC adidas Group 
2001 Labor rights violations in contractor factories persist 
National Labor 
Committee Nike 
2002 Bad working conditions in contractor factories  
CCC, Global 
Exchange, Oxfam 
Canada, Oxfam 
Community Aid 
Abroad; Maquila 
Solidarity Network 
Nike, Adidas 
Group 
2002 Child labor and bad working conditions Global March Sports industry 
44 
2002 Fair Pay Campaign: Improve working conditions CCC Sports industry 
2004 
Play fair at the Olympics campaign: 
Ensure that suppliers and sub-
contractors respect labor rights 
CCC, Global Unions, 
Oxfam Sports industry 
2005 Sweat free Campus Campaign USAS (Sports industry/ universities) 
2006 Responsibility for labor rights violations Oxfam America Sports industry 
2008 
Play fair campaign: Ensure that 
suppliers and sub-contractors respect 
labor rights 
CCC Sports industry 
2008 Child labor in football stitching 
Bachpan Bachao 
Andolan; International 
Labor Rights Forum 
Sports industry 
2010 Responsibility for labor rights violations NLC Reebok 
 
Garment Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1988 Improve working conditions in supplier factories CCC C&A 
1989 Allow labor unions SOMO C&A 
1989 Missing labor unions in factories NLC; Human Rights Watch 
Phillips van-
Heusen 
1993 Respect labor rights NLC  The Gap 
1993 Recognition of the worker union by supplier in Honduras NLC  J.C. Penney 
1995 Bad working conditions in contractors' factories NLC  The Gap 
1995 Reimburse El Salvadoran workers for unpaid wages Sweatshop Watch Clothes retailers 
1996 
Ethics on the Label Campaign: Take 
responsibility for worker rights 
violations in sweatshops 
CCC Clothes retailers and supermarkets 
1996 Responsibility for working conditions in factories MLC 
Disney, J.C. 
Penney 
1996 Responsibility for working conditions in factories  NLC 
Kathie Lee 
Gifford 
1996 European Education Campaign Tour: Bad working conditions CCC, SOMO Garment industry 
1997 Responsibility for bad working conditions in sweatshops CCC Garment industry 
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1997 H&M is criticised for the working conditions in factories in Indonesia CCC H&M 
1997 Support union at contractor factory Human Rights Watch Phillips van-Heusen 
1998 
Fair Wear Campaign in Australia: 
Responsibility for bad working 
conditions 
CCC Garment industry 
1998 Responsibility for sweatshops CAFOD Clothes retailers 
1999 Responsibility for sweatshops Global Exchange The Gap 
2001 Leave Burma Berne Declaration; CCC Triumph 
2002 
Responsibility for bad working 
conditions in sweatshops in Southern 
Africa 
SOMO Clothes retailers 
2003 Illegal worker lock out CCC Tom Tailor 
2003 Labor rights violations in contractor factories  NLC 
J.C. Penney and 
Sears 
2005 Improve cotton sourcing conditions International Crisis Group 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2005 Respect international labor laws in the sourcing of cotton EJF 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2006 Responsibility for working conditions  SOMO Clothes retailers 
2006 Launch of cotton campaign: stop child labor 
International Labor 
Rights Forum Garment industry 
2007 Stop child labor in cotton production and improve working conditions EJF 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2009 Stop child labor in cotton production and improve working conditions EJF 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2009 Monitor supply chain; discourage the usage of dangerous pesticides EJF 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2009 Usage of sweatshops including sourcing cotton from Uzbekistan 
International Labor 
Rights Forum Garment industry 
2010 Stop child labor in cotton production and improve working conditions EJF 
Cotton traders and 
retailers 
2010 Use clean cotton EJF H&M,  Inditex 
 
Toy Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1997 Responsibility for worker rights' violations in contractor factory 
Coalition for the 
Charter On the Safe 
Production of Toys 
Mcdonald's 
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1999 Bad working conditions in Thai toy factories NLC Toy industry 
1999 
"play fair" Campaign in Germany: 
Responsibility for working conditions in 
contractors' factories 
Werkstatt Ökonomie German toy industry 
2001 Responsibility for working conditions in contractor's factories NLC 
Wal-Mart, Toys 
“R” Us,   Hasbro, 
Mattel/Fisher 
Price, Disney and
McDonald’s 
2001 Responsibility for working conditions in factories China Labor Watch 
McDonalds, 
Disney, Hasbro, 
Mattel, Warner, 
Paramount , 
Franklin Mint and 
DC Comics 
2002 
Responsibility for  bad working 
conditions in  contractors' factories; 
ineffective audits 
NLC Mattel, MAG, Sega, Wal-Mart 
2002 Toy Campaign: Responsibility for working conditions at contractors Belgian CCC 
Carrefour, Cora, 
Colruyt/ 
Dreamland, 
Maxitoys 
2002 Responsibility for working conditions in factories Belgian CCC Disney 
2004 Implement better labor practice policies and improve working conditions SwedWatch 
Top Toy, COOP 
and Brio 
2005 Responsibility for working conditions in factories Berne Declaration 
Swiss toy 
industry 
2005 Responsibility for working conditions in factories SACOM Disney 
2005 Improve labor standards in factories China Labor Watch 
McDonald’s, 
KFC, Hasbro and 
Mattel 
2005 Boycott of Wal-Mart Toys China Labor Watch and NLC Wal-Mart 
2006 
Be transparent, improve  code of 
conduct enforcement and monitoring 
system and take responsibility for 
working conditions in factories 
SACOM Disney 
2006 Implement social standards;  monitor and train employees Berne Declaration 
Swiss toy 
industry 
2007 Improve working conditions in contractor factories SACOM Wal-Mart 
2007 Improve working conditions in SACOM Disney 
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contractor factories 
2007 Improve working conditions in contractor factories SACOM Disney 
2007 Improve working conditions in contractor factories SACOM Disney 
2007 
Responsibility for bad working 
conditions in several factories such as 
the Hansheng Wood Products Factory 
NLC R2C 
2008 Responsibility for working conditions in their contractors' factories NLC 
Disney; Hasbro 
and RC2 
2008 
Responsibility for bad working 
conditions in the factory producing 
Ernie and other toys 
NLC K'NEX, Sesame Street and Hasbro 
2009 Responsibility for working conditions in factories 
SACOM, Südwind 
Agentur, Peuples 
Solidaires, Society for 
Fair Trade, AUR, 
Polish Green Network 
Toy industry 
 
IT Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
2004 Improve working conditions at contractors' factories CAFOD 
Dell, Hewlett 
Packard and IBM 
2005 ICT companies violate labor rights SOMO Computer hardware industry  
2005 Violations of labor rights SOMO Fujitsu Siemens, Acer  
2005 Take responsibility for CSR issues SOMO Fujitsu Siemens, Acer  
2006 Violation of labor laws SACOM Motorola 
2006 Increase transparency and accountability SOMO 
IBM, HP, Dell, 
Apple Mac, 
Compaq, Canon, 
Sony, and Philips 
2006 Violations of and responsibility for labor rights in entire supply chain SOMO 
Motorola, Nokia, 
Samsung, Sony 
Ericsson, LG  
2007 Include  extractive industry in their supply chain management SOMO ICT industry 
2007 Violations of labor rights Bread for all 
Hewlett-P ackard, 
Dell, Acer, Apple
und Fujitsu 
Siemens 
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2007 Violations of labor rights violations in  supply chain SOMO 
Mobile phone 
industry 
2007 Violations of labor rights at sub-tier suppliers SOMO 
Fujitsu Siemens,  
Acer, Sony, Dell, 
Hewlett Packard  
2007 Violations of labor rights SOMO ICT industry 
2007 
Include the extractive industry in supply 
chain management and solve problems 
in sphere of influence (labor, health, 
pollution…) 
SwedWatch ICT industry 
2007 Include the extractive industry in  supply chain management Finn Watch ICT industry 
2008 Sustainable and just production of mobile phones Time to Turn 
Mobile phone 
industry 
2008 Violations of labor rights  WEED ICT industry 
2008 Violations of labor rights  SOMO 
Sony, Motorola, 
Nokia, Samsung, 
LG 
2008 Responsibility for labor rights violations in the complete supply chain SOMO & SwedWatch 
Sony, Motorola, 
Nokia, Samsung, 
LG, Apple 
2009 Responsibility for labor rights violations in the complete supply chain 
FinnWatch, SACOM, 
SOMO 
Microsoft , 
Motorola, Philips, 
Apple, Sony 
2009 Violations of labor rights SOMO ICT industry 
2009 Violations of labor rights SOMO Nokia, Motorola, Sony Ericsson 
2009 
Responsibility for labor and human 
rights violations and for environmental 
impact in the supply chain  
SOMO 
KPN, Tele 2, 
Vodafone, T-
Mobile 
2009 Violations of labor rights SOMO, Swed Watch Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, LG  
2009 Do not use minerals from conflict zones Global Witness Mobile phone industry 
2009 Responsibility for labor rights violations in factories producing keyboards NLC 
Hewlett-Packard, 
Lenovo, 
Microsoft, IBM, 
Dell 
 
Diamond Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1998 Finance of civil war in Angola  Global Witness De Beers 
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1999 Do not buy conflict diamonds and be transparent Human Rights Watch Diamond Industry 
2000 Do not buy conflict diamonds and be transparent 
Partnership Africa 
Canada De Beers 
2002 Foster transparent diamond trade Partnership Africa Canada Diamond Industry 
2002 "Publish what you pay" Campaign 
Global Witness, 
CAFOD, Open Society 
Institute, Oxfam GB, 
Save the Children UK 
and Transparency 
International UK 
Diamond industry 
2003 Complicity in forced removal of indigenous community Survival International De Beers 
2005 Respect human rights Wilson Center Diamond Industry 
2005 
"No Dirty Gold" campaign: human 
rights and environmental violations in 
Africa 
Oxfam America Diamond Industry 
2007 Lack of adequate policies to combat blood diamonds 
Global Witness, 
Amnesty International 
US jewelry 
retailers 
2009 Do not buy conflict diamonds and be transparent Human Rights Watch Diamond Industry 
 
Oil Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1990 Human rights violations Global Exchange Oil industry 
1995 Respect human rights  Human Rights Watch Shell   
1995 Do not sink oil platform Brent Spar in the North Sea. Boycott  Shell Greenpeace Shell 
1996 Do not operate in Burma Earth Rights International Total, Unocal 
1996 Complicity in human rights violations in Nigeria 
Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) 
Shell 
1996 Complicity in human rights violations in Burma Burmese population Unocal 
1999 Be transparent Global Witness Oil industry 
1999 Responsibility for human rights violations in Nigeria Human Rights Watch Oil industry 
1999 Be transparent Human Rights Watch Oil industry 
2000 Complicity in human rights violations in Burma 
Earth Rights 
International Unocal, Total 
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2000 Complicity in human rights violations Amnesty International Oil industry 
2000 Complicity in human rights and environmental violations in Nigeria 
Essential Action, 
Global Exchange  Shell 
2000 Urge  Indonesian government to investigate the murder of activists Human Rights Watch ExxonMobil 
2001 Complicity in human rights violations Presbyterian Church of Sudan Talisman  
2002 Irresponsible environmental attitude Greenpeace Esso  
2002 Complicity in human rights violations in Burma  
Earth Rights 
International 
Total, Unocal, 
Premier Oil 
2003 Irresponsible environmental attitude and complicity in human rights violations Greenpeace Esso  
2003 Be transparent and non-complicit in human rights violations in Sudan Human Rights Watch 
Talisman; Lundin 
Petroleum AB , 
TotalFinaElf; 
Shell 
2004 Take responsibility for Valdez disaster Greenpeace Esso 
2004 
Do not do short term investments in 
politically unstable countries such as 
Chad and Cameroon 
Greenpeace Esso  
2004 Co-responsibility for oil spill in Russia Greenpeace Total 
2004 Encourage governments to be transparent Human Rights Watch 
Oil companies 
operating in 
Angola 
2005 Complicity in human rights violations Oil Watch ChevronTexaco 
2006 Take responsibility for Valdez disaster Greenpeace Esso  
2005 Investigate complicity in human rights violations and publish those Amnesty International Shell, Chevron 
2005 Become environmentally responsible Greenpeace Oil industry 
2008 Complicity in human rights violations in Burma  
Earth Rights 
International Chevron  
2009 Complicity in human rights violations in Burma 
Earth Rights 
International Chevron, Total 
2009 Complicity in environmental and human rights violations Various Chevron 
 
Coffee Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
1977 Boycott coffee from Uganda since the trade benefits dictator Idi Amin.  Activists Coffee industry 
1988 Encourage fair trade coffee Solidaridad Coffee industry 
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1989 
Coffee exports fund military death 
squads in El Salvador during the Civil 
War 
Neighbor to Neighbor 
Gerneral Foods, 
Folgers (Procter & 
Gamble) and 
Nestlé 
1990 Boycott Folgers  Neighbor to Neighbor Folgers (P&G) 
1994 Pay fair wages, improve working conditions  US/LEAP Starbucks 
1996 Improve working conditions and monitor suppliers US/LEAP Starbucks 
1999 Support fair trade coffee Global Exchange Coffee industry 
2000 Buy fair trade coffee beans Global Exchange Starbucks 
2000 Improve working conditions Global Exchange Starbucks 
2001 Buy fair trade certified coffee beans Global Exchange Folgers/ P&G 
2002 Support fair trade  Oxfam America Coffee industry 
2002 Improve working and living conditions of coffee farmers Oxfam America Coffee industry 
2002 Join the Global Coffee Rescue Program and pay fair prices Oxfam America Coffee industry 
2003 Buy fair trade coffee beans Berne Declaration Coffee industry 
2006 Bad working and living conditions of coffee farmers Oxfam America Coffee industry 
2007 Support  Ethiopian Coffee Farmers  Oxfam America Starbucks 
 
Chocolate Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR Demand 
2000 Improve economic and social well-being of farmers 
International Institute 
of Tropical Agriculture 
Chocolate 
industry 
2001 Stop child labor International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
Chocolate 
industry 
2002 Fair Trade Cocoa Campaign: Buy fair trade certified cocoa Global Exchange 
Chocolate 
industry 
2002 Stop child labor International Labor Rights Forum 
Nestle, Cargill, 
ADM 
2003 Stop child labor and support fair trade Global Exchange M&M/Mars 
2005 Stop child labor Global Exchange Chocolate industry 
2007 Improve working and living situation of cocoa farmers SwedWatch 
Cloetta Fazer, 
Kraft Foods, 
Nestlé 
2007 Finance of civil war on Ivory Coast Global Witness Chocolate industry 
52 
2008 Improve working and living situation of cocoa farmers Oxfam 
Chocolate 
industry 
2009 Stop child labor and pay fair wages  Berne Declaration Swiss chocolate industry 
2009 Stop child labor International Labor Rights Forum 
Hershey, 
M&M/Mars and 
Nestle 
 
 
Banana Industry 
Date Upstream CSR Demand NGO Target of CSR 
Demand 
1992 Participation in Better Banana Project Rainforest Alliance Chiquita 
1993 Improve working conditions COLSIBA Banana industry 
1996 Corporate responsibility for fair and 
sustainable production 
Banana Link Banana industry 
1998 Cease pesticide usage and support union 
rights  
COLSIBA; US/LEAP, 
EUROBAN 
Chiquita   
1999 Improve working conditions UK Food Group Banana industry 
2000 Respect worker rights The Fairtrade 
Foundation 
Banana industry 
2001 Stop race to the bottom COLSIBA, US/LEAP  
Global Exchange; 
EUROBAN;  
Dole 
2002 Improve working conditions Human Rights Watch Banana industry 
2006 Improve working conditions US/LEAP; COLSIBA Dole 
2007 Improve working conditions Berne Declaration Banana industry 
2007 Improve working conditions and avoid 
human rights violations 
ActionAid Banana industry, 
supermarkets 
2008 Responsibility for human rights 
violations  
Oxfam Germany Discounters 
 
 
